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Abstract 
 
In 2002, David McGee wrote a 
comprehensive report on two important 
elements in the system of public financial 
accountability, namely the office of the 
Auditor General and the parliamentary 
oversight committee commonly referred to 
as the Public Accounts Committee (PAC).  
The purpose of the present paper is to 
deepen McGee’s analysis of PACs. In 
particular, we define PAC success and 
identify those factors that impact on PAC 
peformance. We use data that were 
collected by the World Bank Institute in 
2002, when a survey questionnaire was 
sent to 51 national and state/ provincial 
parliaments in Commonwealth countries 
in Asia and Australasia and Canada and 
the United Kingdom. We find that the 
institutional factors which most account 
for the success of the PACs are the focus 
on government’s financial activity rather 
than its policies, the power to investigate 
all past and present government expenses, 
the power to follow up on government 
action in response to its recommendations, 
and its relationship with the Auditors 
General. 
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1 
Introduction 
 
In 2002, David McGee wrote a comprehensive report on two important elements in the 
system of public financial accountability, namely the office of the Auditor General and the 
parliamentary oversight committee commonly referred to as the Public Accounts Committee 
(PAC)5. Based on the deliberations of a Study Group organized by the Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association (CPA)6, he examined current practice across the Commonwealth 
regarding the roles and functions of Auditors General and PACs and the interaction between 
these two institutions. 
 
The purpose of the Study Group was “to assess how PACs are working in practice and 
whether they are fulfilling expectations as important guarantors of good governance. The 
group … tried to distil the practices … into checklists of considerations for Parliaments, 
always recognizing that social, economic and political factors within each country mean that 
there is no one organizational form that a PAC will take. The group… also discussed and 
tried to define a modern rationale for PACs …[which] is necessitated by and is based on the 
international dimension that results from a greater inter-dependability of nations today … 
[which] … has brought in its wake greater challenges to good (and honest) government.”7 
 
McGee sought to identify possible courses of action to improve outcomes through more 
effective use of PACs. Three main priorities were identified: 
 
• Capacity building – the need to improve the ability of Parliaments and their PACs to 
carry out their functions by being provided with adequate resources, training and access to 
relevant expertise  
• Independence – that they be free from political or legal constraints that could inhibit them 
from carrying out their duties diligently8 
• Information exchange – that PACs have the means to exchange information and ideas so 
as to keep them up-to-date with important developments, changing standards and best 
practices as they emerge9. 
 
The individual conclusions and recommendations of the Study Group are summarized in 
Annex 1. 
 
The purpose of the present paper is to deepen McGee’s analysis of PACs. In particular, we 
seek to attempt to define successful PAC performance and to identify those factors which 
facilitate or hinder such successful performance. We use data that were collected by the 
World Bank Institute (WBI)10 in 2002, when a survey questionnaire was sent to 52 national 
and state/provincial parliaments in Commonwealth countries in Asia and Australasia and 
                                                 
5 McGee, David : The Overseers – Public Accounts Committees and Public Spending, Pluto Press, London 
2002. 
6 and supported by WBI 
7 op cit, p.4-5; from the Study Group organized by the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association 
8 this priority was noted to be particularly important for Auditors General 
9 op. cit, p. 6 
10 In collaboration with the World Bank’s South Asia Financial Management group 
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Canada and the United Kingdom. Thirty-five responses were received of which 33 were 
usable, a response rate of 67 percent. Supplementary interviews (both in person and on the 
telephone), were conducted to seek further insight and clarification to the survey results. 
 
In the first section of this paper, after providing a summary of the role of legislatures in 
financial oversight, we present a general concept of public financial accountability. We 
underline the critical role that PACs play, noting their origin in the 19th century and their 
widespread use throughout the Commonwealth and elsewhere. 
 
Through the data collected by the WBI, we are able to deepen our knowledge about how 
PACs work and, in particular, what – in the views of the chairs of these committees – 
constitutes successful performance and what factors influence such performance. The second 
section of the paper presents the survey instrument and summarizes the broad findings of the 
survey. 
 
Section three investigates the success factors (and constraints) for PAC effectiveness, based 
on the survey results.  In section four, we identify possible benchmarks for measuring the 
effectiveness of PACs, and discuss how developing countries may be able to think about 
strengthening their PACs. 
 
In the fifth and final section of the paper, we draw some conclusions and propose what an 
ideal PAC might be like.  
 
 
Section 1: Legislatures and Public Financial Accountability     
 
i) Role of legislatures 
 
Legislatures perform three functions - representative, legislative, and oversight. They 
perform a representation function in that they represent the will of the people, which is the 
legitimate source of authority in democratic countries. They perform a legislative function 
because, in addition to introducing legislation on their own, they have the power to amend, 
approve or reject government bills. And they perform an oversight function, ensuring that 
governments implement policies and programs in accordance with the wishes and intent of 
the legislature. They undertake this oversight function in two ways: they oversee the 
preparation of a given policy (ex ante oversight) or can oversee the execution and the 
implementation of a given policy (ex post oversight). 
 
Though most legislatures have the power to keep the government accountable for its actions 
and its policies, there is considerable variation in the legislative tools that legislatures can 
employ to perform their oversight function. This variation reflects to a large extent 
differences in the form of government and other constitutional arrangements. These means 
include parliamentary committees, questions in the legislature, interrogations, urgent debates, 
the estimates process, scrutiny of delegated legislation, private members’ motions and 
adjournment debates that allow legislators to raise issues relating to the use or proposed use 
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of governmental power, to call upon the government to explain actions it has taken and to 
require it to defend and justify its policies or administrative decisions11. 
 
One of the tools that a legislature can use to further enhance oversight of the financial 
operations of government is a specialized committee. In the “Westminster model” of 
democracy12, the committee is known as the Public Accounts Committee, or PAC; it is the 
“audit committee” of Parliament and as such is the core institution of public financial 
accountability.13 As Frantzich pointed out more than two decades ago, legislatures need 
useful information to perform their representative, legislative and oversight function 
effectively14.  So do PACs.  This information is generally provided by the legislative auditor, 
or Auditor General. The auditor reports to the legislature and the public at large on whether 
public sector resources are appropriately managed and accounted for by the executive 
government. 
 
ii) Concept of Public Financial Accountability 
Following implementation of a government’s budget, a legislative auditor audits government 
accounts, financial statements, and operations. In most countries, this audit is followed by the 
consideration of the audit findings – which may include value for money and performance 
auditing as well as financial or compliance auditing – by the legislature. If the legislatures’ 
role in the budget process is effective, legislative recommendations to the executive based on 
the deliberation on audit findings put forward by the auditor are reflected in future budgets, 
thus allowing for continuous improvements in public financial accountability. 
 
The exact nature of the relationship and interaction between the legislature and the auditor 
partly depends on the model of the legislative auditor and the reporting relationship to the 
legislature. In most Commonwealth countries, the legislative auditor is the Auditor General, 
whose office is a core element of parliamentary oversight; he/ she reports directly to 
Parliament and the Public Accounts Committee. In some instances, the Auditor General is an 
officer of parliament, which guarantees his/ her independence from the Executive (as in the 
case of Australia and the United Kingdom), while in some other instances, he/ she is 
independent of both the executive and the legislature (as in the case of India). 
                                                 
11 See Pelizzo, Riccardo and Rick Stapenhurst Tools of Legislative Oversight Policy Research Working Paper # 
3388, The World Bank, September 2004 
12  The expression, “Westminster model of democracy’ was developed by political scientist Arend Lijphart. 
According to Lijphart “in this book I use the term Westminster model interchangeably with majoritarian mode 
to refer to a general model of democracy.” See Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy, New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1999, p.9. This model of democracy is defined by: concentration of executive power in one-
party and bare majority cabinets, cabinets dominance, two-party system, majoritarian and disproportional 
systems of elections, interest groups pluralism, unitary and centralized government, concentration of legislative 
power in a unicameral legislature, constitutional flexibility, absence of judicial review, a central bank controlled 
by the executive.  
13 In some countries such as India and Sri Lanka the Public Undertakings Committee co exists with the PAC to 
cover the oversight of autonomous public enterprises 
14 Stephen E. Frantzich, “Computerized Information Technology in the US House of Representatives”, 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, vol. 4, n. 2, 1979, pp. 255-280.  See also Robert Miller, Riccardo Pelizzo and 
Frederick Stapenhurst, “Parliamentary Libraries, Institutes and Offices. The Sources of Parliamentary 
Information”, WBI Working Paper, 2004. 
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The structure and function of the PAC date back to the reforms initiated by William 
Gladstone, when he was British Chancellor of the Exchequer in the mid-19th century. The 
first PAC was established in 1861 by a resolution of the British House of Commons. 
Replicated in virtually all Commonwealth and many non-Commonwealth countries, PACs 
are seen as the apex for financial scrutiny and have been promoted as a crucial mechanism to 
facilitate transparency in government financial operations (see Diagram 1). 
 
Diagram 1 
Across the Commonwealth, however, there 
is considerable variation in PACs’ terms of 
reference and modus operandi.  In some 
instances, for example, the terms of 
reference are narrowly defined; in these 
cases PACs concentrate exclusively on 
financial probity. In other instances, the 
terms of reference are more widely defined; 
here, the committee does not simply focus 
on financial probity but also on the 
efficiency and effectiveness of programs in 
achieving the objectives for which they had 
been established. (Indeed, our findings 
indicate that this “scope of work” is one of 
the principal factors affecting PAC performance.) There is considerable variation, too, 
regarding the relationship between the Auditor General and the PAC, the status of the PAC 
within Parliament, how the PAC conducts its business, on PAC reporting to the legislature 
and on requirements for government follow-up on PAC recommendations. These and related 
issues are examined in detail in McGee (2002)15 An important feature in virtually all 
jurisdictions is the fact that PACs do not question the desirability of a particular policy – that 
is the mandate of parliamentary departmental committees; rather, PACs examine the 
efficiency and effectiveness in the implementation of policy.  
 
But if McGee outlined how PACs work, in an effort to identify good practices across the 
Commonwealth, he did not consider, in any detail, the reasons behind the good practice -- 
what might be called the critical success factors: why are some PACs considered more 
successful, while others are not? Nor did he, in the less successful cases, identify constraints 
hindering performance.  This paper explores such issues in some depth. 
 
 
Section 2: Survey Results – Overview 
 
In the survey undertaken by WBI, PAC Chairs were asked to self-assess the impact of the 
Committee’s work; the responses are summarized in Table 1.  It would appear that PACs are 
most successful acting as a catalyst for improvement in government’s implementation of 
policy decisions and for improvement in the availability of government information to 
                                                 
15 op cit 
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parliament.  In 78.8 percent of cases, PAC chairs state that Committee recommendations are 
accepted by government, while in 63.6 percent of cases, governments implement such 
recommendations. Typical, perhaps, is India, where, over the period 1980 through 1999, the 
government accepted 60.68 percent of recommendations made by the PAC16. Similarly, in 
60.8 percent of cases, PAC recommendations have improved the availability of information 
to parliament. However, the findings show that PACs are less frequently the catalyst for the 
government to change legislation or major policy objectives or to prosecute officials who 
break the norms of probity or present misleading financial information to the public. One 
notable exception is Uganda. Since the mid-1990s, the Ugandan PAC and its sister 
committee, the Committee on Commissions, Statutory Authorities and State Enterprises, 
have worked in close collaboration with police CID officers – so that cases of financial 
wrong-doing that emerge from committee hearings lead directly to police investigations and 
many times to court cases17. 
 
Table 1. Results achieved by the PAC: how frequently has the PAC achieved the 
following result? Percentages 
 
Result achieved Frequently Rarely of N 
Recommendations accepted 78.8 15.2 33 
Recommendations implemented 63.6 27.3 33 
Better information 60.8 18.2 33 
Disciplinary action 27.3 15.2 33 
Modification of legislation 15.2 54.5 33 
 
PAC Chairs were also asked what powers and practices they considered important in 
achieving results. When given a list of 37 potential success factors, most respondents 
considered most of the suggested factors to be “very important” (see Annex 3 for the full 
listing of the 37 factors). 
 
However, when asked what the top three factors critical for success were, a consensus 
began to emerge, especially when Chairs were subsequently asked to identify important 
powers or practices that their committee did not have or follow but which would be 
useful to have. The responses are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
Table 2 shows that there was substantial agreement among respondents concerning the first 
four powers – namely the power to formulate recommendations and publish the conclusions, 
to investigate all past and present expenses, to choose topics without government interference 
and to focus on financial probity rather than policy issues. For all these powers, more than 90 
percent of Chairs rated them as “very important”. There was also considerable, although 
lesser, agreement among respondents on the next four powers – to call witnesses, to examine 
the budget of the legislative auditor, to require cabinet ministers to appear before the 
committee and to view any proposed legislation affecting the legislative auditor. Here, at 
                                                 
16 G.C. Malhotra  “Ensuring Executive Accountability : India’s Public Accounts Committee”, The 
Parliamentarian  April 2000, pp 179-186 
17 A Member’s Handbook Report Based on a Parliamentary Workshop in Entebbe with the World Bank Institue 
and the Parliamentary Centre of Canada, , 1999 
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least 70 percent of respondents thought these powers to be either “very important” or 
“important” – although a significant minority of respondents considered these powers to be  
“not important”. 
 
Table 2. Success and Powers of PACs: How Important is this factor? 
Percentages 
 
 Very 
important 
Important Not 
important 
N 
Formulate recommendations and 
publish the conclusions  
97 3 0 33 
Investigate all past and present public 
expenditures  
93.5 6.5 0 31 
Choose topics for investigation 
without government interference 
90.9 9.1 0 33 
Focus on financial accountability 
rather than on policy 
90.9 9.1 0 33 
Require witnesses to answer questions 87.1 6.45 6.45 33 
Examine the budget of the Legislative 
Auditor 
58.8 35.3 23.5 17 
Require cabinet ministers to appear 
before the committee  
55 15 30 33 
View proposed legislation or the 
amendments to the Legislative 
Auditor’s Act 
47.8 30.4 21.8 23 
 
Regarding composition of the committee, only two of the 37 factors mentioned in the list 
given to the respondents belong to this category. The first factor is the ‘balanced 
representation of all major political parties in the commission”, while the second factor is 
“exclusion of government members from the commission”.  There was again a high degree of 
consensus among respondents, with more than 85 percent reporting these factors as “very 
important” (and 100 percent believing that the exclusion of MPs with cabinet posts a “very 
important” or “important” factor). 
 
Table 3. Success and Composition of the PAC: How important is this factor? 
Percentages 
 
 Very 
Important 
Important Not 
important 
N 
Proportional representation of the 
various parliamentary parties  
86.2 10.3 3.4 29 
Exclusion of MPs with cabinet posts 85.2 14.8 0 27 
 
And finally, with regard to committee practices and procedures, there was again a fairly 
strong consensus among respondents regarding success factors.  As Table 4 indicates, these 
include the keeping of transcripts of meetings, adequate preparation before committee 
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meetings, follow-up procedures on government action regarding committee 
recommendations and close working relations between committee members of different 
political parties. 
 
Table 4. Are Practices and Procedures important for the Success of a PAC? 
Percentages 
 
 Very 
important 
Important Not 
important 
N 
Keeping the transcripts of the 
meetings 
87.9 9.1 3.0 33 
Preparation before Committee 
Meetings 
78.8 18.2 3.0 33 
Procedures to determine whether 
the government has taken any 
step to implement the 
recommendations of the 
Committee  
75.0 18.7 6.3 32 
Close working relationship 
between the members of the 
various political parties  
75.0 15.6 9.4 32 
 
 
Section 3: Success Factors for PACs 
 
Discussed below are the top success factors and best practices, including some comments 
about why they are important and how they help achieve results for the committees that 
suggested them. Also discussed are some reasons why these success factors might not be 
present, or why they don’t work well in certain contexts. We have incorporated related 
success factors together, where this is appropriate. 
 
1. Broad Scope: The power to investigate or review all past, current and committed 
expenditures of government18 
 
The power to oversee all public expenditure provides the PAC with a broad mandate and 
target audience. It gives the PAC a vantage point with respect to a wide range of public 
services, and an entry point into the administration of many departments and agencies even if 
other parliamentary committees are involved in their policy aspects. The wider the PAC 
mandate, the greater it’s potential to deter waste and wrongdoing and encourage better 
management of public resources. 
 
Most committees have this power, although some cannot examine committed expenditures; 
most can also examine revenue administration. But sometimes the full range of public 
                                                 
18 Reasons given for selecting this success factor included: “Be perceived as the principal government watch-
dog;” “To get details and the rationale behind government decisions;” “Keeps a check on administration being 
slack, arbitrary;” “Monitor fiscal discipline;”, and “Effective check on finances.” 
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functions is divided with other committees, such as a committee for public enterprises or 
undertakings. Other possible scope limitations could restrict the committee’s investigations 
of important institutions such as the central bank, or important fields of public administration 
like statutory expenditures that are not voted each year, or tax expenditures. In India, for 
example, the central government PAC is unable to probe into the workings of financial 
institutions or the central bank or the accounting policies and standards of government 
financial reporting, or the adequacy of existing auditing standards in the public sector. 
 
Even with a broad mandate, there are situations that could nullify or reduce PAC 
effectiveness.  Some supporting factors that would help to make the best use of a broad 
mandate are: 
 
y Having a specific permanent reference to examine the public accounts and legislative 
auditor’s reports;  
y Legislative audit reports that get at the causes of problems rather than just recounting the 
problems themselves; 
y Timely publication of the public accounts and legislative auditor’s reports; 
y Co-operation of all committee members especially those from the governing party - a 
willingness to both criticize the government’s performance, and to help it perform better; 
y Clear demarcation of responsibilities with other legislative committees; 
y Good support from the legislative auditor (but not too much dependence); 
y Effective  planning and priority-setting process in the committee; 
y Adequate briefing, support, resources for identifying important issues. 
 
All these further conditions are important. For example, it is common, and important, to have 
a permanent reference to examine the public accounts and legislative audit reports.  
Through their examination of legislative audit reports, many PACs have the opportunity to 
examine questions of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, depending, of course, on the 
type of information provided by the legislative auditor and the attitude of the committee. 
Some committees are more comfortable dealing with instances of fraud, waste and abuse 
with brief audit notes about problems, rather than with broad value for money issues such as 
discussing systems weaknesses, policy specifications, legislative loopholes or cultural factors 
that caused the problems in the first place. The preferences of the Committee Chair may be a 
contributing factor. 
 
Another problem noted was that sometimes the tabling of the accounts and audit reports are 
delayed, leaving the PAC to deal with old issues or without work until the documents are 
available; similarly, there are times when the heavy workload of old reports delays getting to 
the most current material. While some committees face a serious backlog of work,19 others 
have found ways to deal with this problem.  Here are two examples:  
 
                                                 
19 We know of several committees that did not respond to our survey and are not up to date with audit reports; 
for example one has not yet started to review the audit reports of 1998-99 which were submitted to the 
legislature in April 2000. Some are even further behind. Some are waiting for work because the audit reports are 
late. One could speculate that embarrassment about this situation may have been a factor in not responding to 
the survey. 
9 
“[In the past] the practice of the committee was to take [Comptroller and 
Auditor General] CAG reports on a first-in first-out basis …the reports of the 
CAG kept accumulating, resulting in a lackadaisical attitude on the part of 
government officials. Therefore, to improve the state of affairs …the 
Committee now takes up recent reports, and accords paragraphs …different 
priorities.” 
 
“The Committee was able to finish a year’s work in less than a year through 
regular meetings.” 
 
Clearly a move towards last in first out (LIFO) may be a preferred option to the conventional 
first in first out (FIFO) method of arranging deliberation of audit reports.  Some terms of 
reference state or imply a detailed examination of the accounts, or a concentration on 
compliance rather than value for money20.  
 
Case 1   UNITED KINGDOM 
 
The United Kingdom PAC has 10 government and 6 opposition members with an opposition 
member as chair. It was established in 1861. It issues an average 10-20 reports a year based 
on the reports of the National Audit Office (NAO). The PAC sometimes looks beyond the 
audit reports to root causes of problems. For example, in 1994 it issued a groundbreaking 
report called “the Proper Conduct of Public Business” that provided a broad checklist of 
improvements to help departments avoid the failings in financial administration that had 
brought them before the auditors and the PAC in the past. 
 
In 1999, the PAC asked the NAO to examine the Committee’s impact. The NAO agreed, and 
provided a detailed, frank assessment for the Committee’s private information. The review 
identified and assessed three main aspects of the PAC’s impact:  
y The government’s implementation of the Committee’s recommendations; 
y The views of senior public servants who were most often witnesses before the Committee 
and whose departments were the subject of its reports; and 
y The quality of press coverage of PAC hearings and reports, as measured in various ways 
including coverage by leading journalists. 
 
The assessment reviewed some known examples of PAC reports that had been implemented, 
including a recent follow-up report that convinced the government to abolish an agency.  
 
This case illustrates a very close relationship between a PAC and a legislative auditor. Both 
have achieved useful results, some of which can be quantified. Although the review of 
impact was not an independent study of the Committee’s effectiveness, it breaks new ground 
in the measurement of PAC performance. 
 
                                                 
20 For example, Singapore and India, although in the case of India the PAC’s mandate extends beyond 
compliance with rules and regulations to control over expenditure, its probity, wisdom, faithfulness and 
economy. 
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Some committees interpret a permanent reference of documents as meaning they must 
systematically review all aspects of all reports, rather than selecting the most important ones. 
Others take the reference of these documents as a limitation that they cannot examine 
anything else. But most set priorities and select important matters within their scope to 
examine, sometimes taking a creative look at root problems (see Case 1)21.  
 
2. Free Choice: The Power to Choose Subjects for Examination without Government 
Direction and Advice22  
 
This power provides the PAC with the freedom of action to focus on relevant, important 
matters. Having a broad scope mandate is of little use if the committee is unable to identify 
major issues or if the government directs the committee away from these. PAC Chairs 
reported that they are most effective if they can initiate enquiries on their own as necessary, 
without having to wait for a specific reference from the government.23 The elements of speed 
and even of surprise are often important here: if the committee can act quickly to select 
incisive issues, and if the choice and timing cannot be predicted by the government and the 
public service, the committee’s enquiries can have a deterrence effect. 
 
Some committees focus primarily on specific audit notes or individual transactions 
uncovered by the legislative auditor. Relevant, important subjects would certainly include 
looking beyond individual grants, contracts and other transactions for the larger system 
weaknesses that make the individual problems inevitable. Committees should factor in the 
likelihood and practicality of the government taking corrective action on the subjects 
addressed. Consideration should also be given to whether the PAC is the most effective 
vehicle for dealing with an issue or whether other committees or institutions could not have 
dealt it with adequately. 
 
The selection of important, relevant issues depends in turn on a number of supporting factors, 
some of which were identified and supported in the survey:  
 
y Co-operation of all parties on the committee 
y Clear focus on accountability, rather than on policy 
y Effective research staff with knowledge of public administration and accountability 
y Members with relevant experience 
y Clear vision of improvements needed in public administration 
y Effective chairing 
 
                                                 
21 British Columbia (Canada) is another good example of a committee that works with their legislative auditor 
to identify important matters for follow up. 
22 Reasons given for selecting this success factor are: “Helped the ad-hoc committee work independently 
without government interference;” “Issue rigorous reports and decide on own agendas, inquiries;” “Select 
matters of concern and hold government accountable;” “Maintain independence;” “Undertake enquiries in areas 
of concern;” and, “Allows PAC to scrutinize all areas of government accountability.” 
23 New South Wales is an example - much more activity and greater effectiveness once its mandate was 
changed 
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If these conditions are missing, for example if there is a highly partisan atmosphere, the 
committee’s ability to choose subjects freely will be reduced. With a government majority on 
most committees, some restrictions in selection are inevitable. 
 
Having a clear focus on accountability is one way to instill a unity of purpose among 
different parties. Almost all PACs surveyed thought this was very important. For example, if 
all committee members can agree with the objective of holding the government accountable 
for spending, and for the stewardship of public assets, then the committee can focus on 
implementation of government programs rather than policy matters, and focus on the 
accountability of civil servants for administrative and financial operations rather than on the 
political accountability of ministers. This will help at all stages of a committee’s work - 
selecting issues, carrying out an enquiry, and drafting a report. If all parties in the committee 
agree on a clear focus at the beginning of an enquiry, the chair will have a much easier time 
keeping the committee on track towards a useful conclusion.  
 
3. Effective Analysis and Reporting: The power to make recommendations and publish 
conclusions24   
 
Virtually all committees value the power to report publicly.  Most committees produce 
specific reports, with recommendations at the end of each enquiry, although not all enquiries 
can be brought to a successful conclusion in a report. Some committees also produce an 
annual report and, further, may request a debate in the legislature. Some also require a 
response from the government within a set time. 
 
In many jurisdictions, the reports and recommendations follow closely those of the 
legislative auditor, and some25 depend on the auditor to follow up their recommendations 
when the work of the audit office itself is being followed up. Where both the PAC and 
legislative auditor make recommendations, close collaboration and support of each other’s 
work is essential. A division of labor that seems to be effective is when the legislative auditor 
reports on the status of government administration and performance of civil servants  and the 
PAC adds a broader perspective of the political economy to this information by identifying 
the root causes and practical solutions.  
 
The completion of a successful enquiry and report depends in turn on a number of conditions 
(some of which were identified in the survey as success factors): 
 
y A focused enquiry with clear objectives (for example, in Australia the purpose of 
questioning witnesses in connection with a legislative audit report is not to analyze all the 
findings and recommendations in detail, but to seek action commitments that can be reported 
and then followed up)  
y Effective drafting procedures for reports 
y All party agreement on the recommendations, to increase the likelihood of acceptance 
                                                 
24  Reasons given for selecting this success factor are: “Publish reports;” “Seek government response Ensures 
implementation and review; Allows committee to express itself; Forms basis for debate and follow-up; To 
ensure accountability to taxpayer 
25 United Kingdom, Canada, Ontario, British Columbia, and probably many others 
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y Good research and analysis support from staff 
y Effective follow-up procedures, to increase the likelihood of implementation. 
 
One of these additional factors in particular received strong support from PAC Chairs - 
effective follow-up procedures.  Follow-up is closely related to the power to make 
recommendations and publish conclusions, because suggested improvements are of little use 
if they are not implemented.   Surprisingly, two Chairs thought this was not important 26 but 
most rated it “very important” to encourage the government to act, and to track the 
committee’s record and therefore effectiveness (see Case 2). 
 
All these comments highlight the importance of a coherent process of follow-up and 
accountability to the committee for dealing with the matters raised in the relevant reports. 
 
4. Solid Technical Support: From the legislative auditor and research staff  
 
The diligence and skill of committee investigations depends on many factors such as 
bipartisan co-operation (see below), good chairmanship, and the ability of individual 
members to probe reluctant witnesses. Underlying many of these is solid research support. 
Good advice and information is helpful in selecting important issues and pursuing them to a 
conclusion.  
 
The legislative auditor is usually the chief support for the Committee - the “friend, 
philosopher and guide”27 as one committee explained. In some cases, the legislative auditor 
sits with the committee28, or provides staff directly to the PAC or performs work otherwise 
done by committee staff. The committees in our survey had an average of less than two 
professional staff assigned full-time, but the range was wide, from 0 to 22. These numbers 
could include professional staff providing procedural advice and report drafting skills. We 
are not aware of any cases of research being contracted out, but this probably happens. 
Surprisingly, two of the survey respondents thought that relations with the legislative auditor 
was not important, while three thought the use of outside expertise and research support was 
not important.  But most others gave these factors a high rating. 
 
Especially when a committee decides to tackle difficult issues, it needs skills and practices to 
obtain and analyze information and testimony. In some countries outside the Commonwealth, 
more of an adversarial relationship with witnesses is brought to bear either by the legislative 
auditor, who acts as a “court of accounts”, or by committees with legal help and more 
judicial powers. In most Commonwealth PACs, it has been suggested that “fair play and 
decorum” usually prevail, in contrast, for example, to the life and death partisan battles in US 
congressional committees29. The need for legal training and help in cross-examining 
                                                 
26 South Australia, Prince Edward Island 
27 See parliament of India web site description of the workings of the PAC. 
28 In India and Ontario, for example, the legislative auditor is allowed to ask questions of witnesses 
29 Teething the Watchdogs is a 1992 University of Strathclyde report of a panel discussion comparing US and 
United Kingdom legislative committees. See the quote from a United Kingdom official on p. 4: “I’ve seen 
senior officials from my old department the Home Office putting up very effective and courteous stone-walling 
performances in front of the Home Affairs Select Committee and, if it is courteously done, I think the select 
committee genuinely accepts that the officials are playing within the rules and it doesn’t press them too hard for 
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witnesses seems to be less important in Commonwealth countries, although there are 
examples where it has been important30.  
 
Case 2    INDIA 
 
The Committee on Public Accounts (PAC) of the Government of India is composed of 14 
government and 8 opposition members, with an opposition chair. Committee members are 
elected from both houses of Parliament. The PAC has been in existence since 1921 and is 
referred to as “the eyes and ears of the legislature”. It generally produces more than 10 
reports a year, and works very closely with the Comptroller and Auditor General, whose 
reports the PAC can examine even before they are tabled in the House (although it cannot 
report on them until they are tabled). The Committee keeps track of recommendations 
implemented by the Government - over 60% in the past 20 years, and more once the 
Committee follows up. An early example of an important accomplishment was the 
implementation of the PAC’s 1947-48 recommendation to establish internal audit. On 
occasion the PAC has initiated its own independent enquiries, for example into tax evasion 
by a foreign bank.  
 
The PAC usually examines a selection of the instances of unauthorized or extravagant 
expenditure and other cases raised in the auditors’ reports, and sometimes these lead to larger 
issues such as in the following example. 
 
In 1993-94, a PAC report commented on the failure of India’s Export Processing Zones to 
live up to expectations. The Committee was following up on previous recommendations 
aimed at helping these special zones meet their target of producing 8-10% of total national 
exports. In the 1980s, export zones had contributed only 2-3% of total exports. The 
Committee was concerned to learn that in the 1991-93 period, the rate was still in the 2-3% 
range, even though instructions had been issued to implement the PAC‘s previous 
recommendations. In response to the PAC follow-up report, the government commissioned a 
special study to evolve a strategy for attracting foreign capital and technology and improving 
export performance. The Committee may follow up again, although it has not yet done so. 
From past experience, the Committee claims that on occasion the announcement of its 
intention to hold further hearings has had a deterrent effect. 
 
This case illustrates an attempt to deal with a major issue: the fact that the results of an 
important government program were not being monitored or reported adequately. The 
Committee has taken a high-level approach to the problem and focused on the final result, 
leaving it to the government to decide on and monitor the means to improve export 
performance.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
information.” Compare this with p.5: “If there’s something partisan going on [in a US committee], if it’s 
Republican against Democrat, hard politics, then politics in Washington is very much a blood sport and they 
would not hesitate to go in for the kill and I think that’s much different than the way it’s practiced in England”. 
One panelist concluded: “Governance is not a matter for amateurs any more” (p. 10) 
30 See Case 3. A study could be done of whether PAC members with legal training are more effective 
questioners 
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Some supporting conditions that help create solid research support for committees are: 
 
y Communication skills of all concerned, especially the legislative auditor who has to 
translate financial and technical material into lay terms 
y Adequate resources for expert staff and advisors, for independent expert witnesses, and 
perhaps for travel and public hearings; 
y Trust between staff, experts and committee members, in particular the assurance that staff 
are non-partisan; 
y Good relationship between researchers and the public service and/or strong access to 
information rules. 
 
 
Case 3   CANADA 
 
In the last parliament, the federal PAC in Canada had 9 government and 8 opposition 
members with an opposition chair. It produced 10-20 reports a year based mainly on the 
reports of the Auditor General of Canada. The PAC also conducted enquiries on its own, 
most recently about international financial reporting standards for the public sector, and 
internal audit and evaluation. The government pays close attention to PAC recommendations 
and has already implemented those made a few years ago as a result of another independent 
enquiry supporting more frequent reporting for the Auditor General.  
 
This case concerns an independent PAC investigation about 25 years ago beginning with a 
short reference in the Auditor General’s report to unsubstantiated payments made by Atomic 
Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), a crown corporation. The Committee conducted a 
detailed enquiry into more than C$20 million that AECL had paid to agents abroad in hopes 
of selling nuclear reactors it manufactured. The Committee concluded the Corporation 
followed totally unacceptable business practices, and reported that they suspected some of 
the payments were used for illegal or corrupt purposes. The PAC went far beyond the audit 
report, wrote many letters, called many witnesses including the retired company President, 
held 17 hearings over the course of a year, and wrote a far-reaching report that recommended 
major changes in the accountability regime for crown corporations that were subsequently 
implemented. During the course of the enquiry, all committee members actively cross-
examined hostile witnesses. The media gave the enquiry front-page attention and were able 
to uncover additional evidence the Committee could not have obtained on its own.  
 
This case illustrates a number of features of an effective PAC: selection of important issues, a 
focused enquiry tenaciously pursued, and a big-picture report with recommendations that are 
implemented. 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, lack of resources was not mentioned too often as a problem - the survey 
results are not conclusive on this point31.  The survey did not enable us to obtain sufficient 
                                                 
31 We would have thought resources were the key variable here, but there was no correlation between the 
number of committee professional staff and the results committees reported achieving. United Kingdom, one of 
the most effective committees, has only one professional staff member. We did not collect information on how 
many staff or other resources legislative auditors provide to committees. We have no clear idea what the large 
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information on the value added by outside expertise, or how often independent witnesses 
testify, although the findings are clear that all committees value/ need strong research 
support. 
 
5.  Bi-Partisan Climate:   
 
Strong disagreements between and/ or within political parties can be very damaging to the 
PAC. Parliaments are, by definition, arenas for the clash of ideas, and it is not surprising that 
differences of principle and even partisan issues in the legislature sometimes carry over into 
the PAC.  Sometimes the partisan differences reach a point where the government is 
unwilling to accept any criticism or to act on valid complaints, and the opposition for its part 
overplays minor misdemeanors.32 
 
Some of the survey respondents alluded to partisan problems.  Having a balanced 
representation among parties within the committee - most Chairs thought it was “very 
important” and five respondents identified it among their top three success factors. 
Developing a close working relationship among members from different political parties also 
applies - most Chairs thought this very important, although none identified it among their top 
three.  Another factor contributing to a bi-partisan climate is having a clear focus on 
implementation of policy, and not on whether policies are good or bad.33   
 
Is a close balance of party representatives on the committee important, rather than a large 
government majority? There are examples of effective PACs with large government 
majorities, but this undoubtedly places more pressure on the need for a skilled and 
experienced opposition representation and chairmanship. A legislature with only a few 
opposition members will likely have a difficult time staffing the PAC as well as other 
committees.  
 
The survey provided some evidence that the United Kingdom and Australia have been quite 
successful in defusing partisan disagreements. There are checks and balances built into these 
models -- opposition chair but government majority; focus on administration but not policy; 
focus on public servants and not ministers (in United Kingdom only) -- that help to work 
around partisan problems and make it adaptable to varied situations. In addition there are 
special factors in the United Kingdom Parliament that support committee work as a career 
path, including the longer tenure of MPs on the committee and the large number of members 
who cannot hope to become government ministers. The United Kingdom PAC also declines 
to mediate between the legislative auditor and the government in disputes about the facts of a 
case, thus eliminating one cause of partisan friction in the committee and avoids time-
                                                                                                                                                       
number of professional committee staff in India does - one committee with a large staff still identified lack of 
staff as a problem. Perhaps the type or skills of staff may be a problem rather than the number. This would 
require more work 
32  Malaysia did not respond to the survey, but we were told that 30 years ago the PACs in that country were 
chaired by opposition members, but since then have been chaired by a government member. If true, it would be 
useful to investigate this further 
33 In one case a PAC has expressed the view that there is need for flexibility regarding dealing with important 
matters of public concern regardless of the line between policy and implementation. This view is based on the 
ground that policy is good only when it is implementable 
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consuming discussions about whether something happened, rather concentrating on why it 
happened and what has been done to prevent it happening again.  
 
In Australia (federal and state parliaments), the Committee chairs - most of whom are 
government members - place great emphasis on operating in a non-partisan manner and on 
reaching unanimous agreement about agendas and reports. But unlike in the United 
Kingdom, the federal PAC in Australia also deals with disputed issues between the executive 
branch and the legislative auditor. This Committee is able to select a wide range of issues of 
public accountability on a non-partisan basis regardless of whether the issue is raised in the 
Auditor General’s Report.34 
 
Interviews provided some further suggestions for diffusing partisan disagreements: 
 
y Reducing ministerial involvement both as members and as witnesses (but having former 
ministers may provide valuable experience) 
y Sometimes a minority government or close balance of parties in the legislature heightens 
partisan tensions in the PAC; while at other times it creates the need for co-operation. 
One would expect a minority government to tolerate or compromise on administrative 
issues that don’t threaten to become election rallying points. 
y Sometimes an experienced and skilled chair can develop strategies to avoid or minimize 
partisan deadlock; sometimes not. In-camera meetings to set agendas and review or draft 
reports help.35 
y Sometimes election by the legislature of the committee chair, provision of a special salary 
and/ or other perquisites can increase the prestige of the position and make it attractive to 
politicians who might otherwise seek more partisan rewards. 
 
In short, while there is no panacea for tempering the partisan climate, it can sometimes be 
reduced by the changes discussed above and by other means, such as clearly focusing on 
accountability for implementing approved policy objectives without questioning the 
objectives themselves.  
 
6.   Public Involvement and Media Coverage:   
 
There are regional differences in the extent of public involvement in the PAC and 
parliamentary affairs generally and opinion is divided on whether the media should have 
access to PAC meetings. However there are examples where the media has provided valuable 
                                                 
34 The committee has held hearings on the working of the wider sector accounting profession. 
35 The recent European Union study of  Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI) and Parliamentary Committees  (PC) 
identified 6 factors that help prevent politicisation of audit-related meetings: a) the organisation of the 
parliamentary committee’s work according to the Parliament’s Standing Orders, b) the participation in PC 
meetings of officers responsible for the matters being discussed, and other experts, c) the participation in PCs of 
members from all political parties and the right of all members to be heard, d) the oath each MP takes which 
provides for adherence and respect for the Constitution and other legislation, e) in some of the countries the 
MPs endeavour to avoid politicising PC sittings when the SAI-related matters are discussed, f) in case of 
committees that are, exclusively or mainly, in charge of state audit-related issues, the position of a chairman is 
sometimes held by a representative of an opposition party (the Czech Republic, Malta, Poland) or a 
representative of an opposition party holds the position of a vice-chairman. 
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information for a PAC enquiry (see Case 3) and media presence may also keep public 
servants and auditors on their toes and perhaps encourage more realistic government 
commitments for follow-up. 
 
Case 4 NEW SOUTH WALES (Australia) 
 
The Public Accounts Committee of New South Wales, Australia, has 3 government and 3 
opposition members, with the chair from the governing party. It was established in 1902, but 
its powers were significantly increased in the early 1980s, with bipartisan support. At that 
time it began to initiate its own enquiries and hold public hearings, supported by its own 
secretariat and working closely with the Auditor General. 
 
This case concerns several PAC inquiries into the justice system. Increasing caseloads and 
litigation have burdened the many agencies involved in the justice system, including the 
police and courts themselves. The end result, for the public, was a feeling of powerlessness 
and concern about the quality of justice and about serious delays in the courts. In 1995, the 
Auditor General conducted a preliminary audit of the performance of the court system. The 
PAC decided to focus on one aspect of the subject on which parliamentarians had a special 
vantage point - the impact of the system on the public.  It invited briefs from interested 
parties, held public hearings, and published a bipartisan report with many recommendations 
to improve the court experience for the public.  
 
Since then, many changes, several government enquiries, and a follow-up audit have taken 
place. There have been big improvements in waiting times for criminal cases in the Supreme 
and District courts, and case management procedures and time standards have been 
introduced.  But the rapid growth in civil cases has continued to cause problems. So, in 2001, 
the PAC began another public enquiry. By focusing this time on the results achieved by the 
courts in the context of the justice system as a whole, they attempted to ensure that 
bottlenecks are removed, not just moved. Their report has now been published, and it 
recommends broad changes including greater use of alternative dispute resolution, 
compulsory mediation, and penalization of legal practitioners who unnecessarily delay civil 
cases. The Committee anticipates that this report will receive a positive response from the 
government, as did their first one. 
 
This case takes a system-wide look at a problem from the public’s perspective. In doing so it 
illustrates a useful and inexpensive way to involve the public directly in a PAC enquiry that 
builds on the work of the legislative auditor but does not rehash it. It also illustrates a 
tenacious follow-up program that builds credibility for the PAC’s future work. 
 
Committees in the “developed Commonwealth” (Australia, Britain, Canada and New 
Zealand) tend to meet in public while elsewhere the practice is mixed.  Committees in South 
Asia generally do not meet in public, but the committees in Jamaica, Singapore and South 
Africa do, as did the ad-hoc committees in Pakistan between 1999 and 2002. The argument 
that is made in South Asia is that secrecy facilitates frank exchanges with witnesses; however 
the success of PAC performances in these countries is no better than in other jurisdictions. 
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Keeping meetings closed from the public is a little surprising in the case of Rajasthan, India, 
which has made great strides in opening up the budget process to public input but where 
there does not appear to be any corresponding move to open up the PAC to public discussion 
of how the budget is implemented. The same situation exists in the Indian states of Orissa 
and Karnataka. The United Kingdom is also somewhat of a surprise as, until 1977, the PAC 
met in camera and still does not hear outside witnesses. But there are some changes under 
way to encourage public involvement in the budgeting process in the United Kingdom, and 
there are already other avenues of direct public feedback on government services through the 
Citizen’s Charter. In fact, the emphasis on published performance measures in Australia, 
Canada and the United Kingdom involves the public directly in assessing the quality of 
service delivery. Closer direct contact between the executive and the public is not 
inconsistent with public involvement in the PAC, and can provide new and relevant 
information to help the PAC hold the government to account. 
 
Important powers include the ability to compel ministers to attend, to subpoena witnesses and 
to hold witnesses in contempt of Parliament if they fail to answer questions, can be useful. 
Where such power is lacking, the glare of publicity can compensate for the lack of this 
power. Getting the media involved in an enquiry can sometimes bring to light evidence that 
would not have appeared otherwise (see Case 4).  
 
Case 5   IRELAND 
 
The PAC has operated since the foundation of the State in 1922 and both it and the Office of 
Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) are modelled on the United Kingdom equivalents. 
 
In early 1998 media reports suggested there might be significant evasion of Deposit Interest 
Retention Tax through the use of bogus non-resident bank accounts. (The total amount of 
money held in non-resident bank accounts was in the billions on pounds, much of it 
legitimate.). The PAC sought to investigate the matter but concluded it had insufficient 
powers to do so. This led to the enactment of the Comptroller and Auditor General and 
Committees of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Special Provisions) Act, 1998 which granted 
extensive quasi-judicial powers to the C&AG and allowed him to investigate the operation of 
the tax by the revenue authorities and the financial institutions, and to report his findings to 
parliament. This investigation broke new ground and the C&AG’s report formed the basis for 
a subsequent public inquiry by a sub-committee of the PAC into the whole affair which 
generated enormous public interest. It led ultimately to the payment of significant sums by 
the financial institutions and others to the revenue authorities. The affair raised public 
awareness of the PAC and the Office of the C&AG significantly. 
 
Some committees, for example in Australia, Ireland36 and Canada tend to accept testimony 
from outside experts as well as the general public, rather than relying totally on the 
legislative auditor and public servants (see Cases 4 and 5). The PAC in New South Wales, 
Australia is a particularly good example of this trend because it considers public education as 
                                                 
36 Not a Commonwealth country, but has a Westminster parliamentary system 
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one of its primary responsibilities, and often picks subjects for examination that benefit from 
direct public input, such as the level of service that the government provides.  
 
In general, those committees that do not meet in public, or accept input from the general 
public and particular interest groups, are missing a key source of information, which likely 
hinders their effectiveness. 
 
In summary, the success factors that PACs themselves consider most important include: 
 
y Having a broad scope 
y Power to select issues without government direction 
y Power to report conclusions, suggest improvements and follow up on these 
y Strong support from the legislative auditor, members and research staff that creates a 
unity of purpose about PAC work 
y Having a bi-partisan relationship among Committee Members 
y Involving the public and encouraging media coverage 
 
There are other factors that were rated highly, many of which support these. The survey 
results support the view, for example, that a PAC will be more effective if it meets regularly 
to keep up to date with the progress of public business, if Members are well prepared for 
Committee meetings and if detailed records are kept of Committee meetings. 
 
It should be noted, however, that the possession of these powers does not guarantee success, 
nor does their absence necessarily hinder PAC effectiveness. Said one Chair 
 
[The committee] “does not have a mandate to report to the House any of its 
deliberations, opinions or recommendations pertaining to government operations. 
Furthermore, although committees of the legislative assembly in general theoretically 
enjoy the power to send for persons, papers and records, the Committee has never 
done so. Correspondingly, the Committee has never recommended to the House that 
it censure the government for contravening … [the] law, nor has it ever recommended 
to the House that it exercise its penal powers of arrest and detention over government 
officials who fail to comply with orders of the House. The deputy chairman hails 
from the governing party, and members of the governing party dominate the 
Committee in number, thus effectively silencing any attempts to substantively 
investigate matters pertaining to the Public Accounts, policy objectives and program 
delivery. Since the Committee has rarely, if ever, presented a substantive report to the 
House, the government has never had to issue a comprehensive response. The 
legislative assembly … has never referred a substantive matter to the Committee. 
Lastly, the Committee is hamstrung by a lack of a budget to employ the services of a 
research and investigative staff ...” 
 
This particular committee lacks many of the success factors discussed in this paper and 
considers its current mandate a serious constraint.  This situation is atypical; however, as 
many other committees elsewhere seem to cope with similar restrictions, and yet appear to 
function reasonably well. Some of the common problems, such as not holding meetings or 
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writing reports; not addressing important issues; not keeping up to date with the reports of 
the legislative auditor, or giving too much attention to superficial issues, have already been 
highlighted.   From the responses received, however, it would appear that an analysis of 
constraints has to go beyond the absence of particular powers and practices and ask why 
powers have not been granted or, if granted, are not used.  By looking at the broader 
environment in which legislative oversight takes place, it is possible perhaps to learn more 
about why some PACs work better than others.  
 
As noted above, the PAC is part of a broader external public financial accountability system 
that includes many other actors, including the government, the Auditor General and the 
public. These relationships bear further investigation. How the individual actors interact 
determines the effectiveness of the whole. But this is complex territory - it involves 
conjecture into political and other constraints that may well be indigenous to each of the 
jurisdictions examined - and there are no clear answers.   
 
One determining factor is the willingness of government to allow parliament in general, and 
the PAC in particular, sufficient political space to carry out their constitutional mandates. 
There are several interrelated problems: the inherent weaknesses of parliamentary 
committees and of parliamentarians, and the lack of commitment on the part of some 
governments in correcting these weaknesses. And then there is the perception that given the 
history of an adversarial relationship between the auditor and the auditee the ‘findings’ of the 
legislative auditor are too negative and not always sufficiently balanced or presented to 
invoke better operational performance. 
 
Oversight requires knowledge, skills and experience that many parliamentarians do not have, 
and who often report difficulty in “learning on the job”. Representing, as they do, all walks 
of life and all geographic regions, they often face a huge information deficit when 
questioning an important senior official backed by the technical resources of the government. 
It is not always in the government’s interest to enhance the knowledge and skills to make this 
confrontation a success. Even if committee members do not feel intimidated, they can easily 
be put off by procedural tactics, or baffled by detail, or discouraged from asking in-depth 
questions that firmly establish the causes or responsibility for problems. As a result, MPs 
may feel powerless, possess less knowledge, and prefer other activities to committee work. 
Their lack of knowledge, depth or diligence may create a self-fulfilling prophecy - the 
government may lose respect for the role of legislative oversight, and have no confidence 
that useful results can come out of it37.  
 
In the United States, there is a more even balance of power between the legislature and the 
executive. There is no equivalent to the PAC in the congressional system, where all 
committees have forward-looking policy responsibilities and review or post-audit functions 
with a strong audit office supporting the work of the committees. In the Westminster system 
the executive branch is very powerful and committees have fewer powers and resources than 
in the United States. Why, then, in a parliamentary system, would the government be willing 
to suffer public criticism of its activities when it doesn’t have to? It could, instead, depend 
                                                 
37 In Australia, the PAC did not meet for almost 20 years from 1932-1951 because the Government decided it 
was unnecessary. 
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more on internal audit and review, or force the PAC and legislative auditor to operate in 
camera, like internal review mechanisms generally do. The government could, if it wishes, 
control the PAC by the way it uses its powers, for example, to appoint the majority of 
members and the chair, select issues, shut down enquiries and decline to implement 
recommendations.  
 
Yet there is a trend in certain Commonwealth countries (namely the United Kingdom, 
Canada and Australia and more recently, emerging in countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Sri 
Lanka, and Uganda) to strengthen the role of parliamentarians and parliamentary committees. 
In the United Kingdom, the chair is usually a former Treasury minister who has first-hand 
experience in the subjects the PAC deals with.  And these countries have opened up their 
PACs and other committees to public input and exposure.   
 
 
Section 4: Benchmarks for Measuring PAC Performance? 
 
A question we sought to answer as we examined factors for success for PACs is: “Are there 
potential indicators or benchmarks that can be used when examining PACs?”   
 
At present there is no international standard setting process for legislative functions such as 
oversight and control of the public purse.  Is it possible to develop an index for the 
effectiveness of PACs?  It is not surprising that public sector accounting and auditing is 
perceived to have fallen behind comparable improvements in private sector and other aspects 
of good corporate governance despite some advances on the part of legislative auditors.  This 
particular gap between the public and private sector financial accountability standards and 
practices is likely to grow given there is no existing force to address this critical issue. 
However, there are some encouraging signs. For example, international auditing associations 
have set some international audit standards; Auditors General have already made 
considerable progress38.  But the same cannot be said for PACs, where development of 
standards has been uneven and slow.  Nonetheless, it would appear that a comprehensive 
framework for assessing PAC performance would encompass several different dimensions or 
types of information: 
 
y Activity level - the measurement of events and input resources used such as: 
y keeping up to date with legislative auditor’s reports,  
y costs and time of staff, members, witnesses and others involved.  
y Output level - the immediate visible results of work the committee does like: 
y recommendations made, followed up and implemented 
y Outcomes level - durable improvements in public administration such as: 
y increased economy, efficiency or effectiveness of government programs 
y better compliance with laws or regulations,  
y improvements in financial and control structures, such as prosecution of 
wrongdoers, stronger powers for legislative auditor 
y more accurate, timely government information 
y enhanced public awareness of government programs 
                                                 
38 International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), Proposed Strategic Plan 2005-2010 
22 
y enhanced legislative knowledge about the state of the management of programs 
 
All three dimensions of performance are important. Beyond these indicators, there is a 
question whether the PAC is actually dealing with important issues such as the root causes 
rather than the symptoms of problems (like corruption), and the deterrence effect of the PAC 
on the behavior of public servants. Some call this dimension of performance “relevance”39.  
 
Case 6    QUEBEC (Canada) 
 
The Committee on Public Administration (CPA) in Quebec has 6 government and 4 
opposition members, with an opposition chair. The CPA took over from the former PAC in 
1997 with new responsibilities that stressed administrative, non-partisan action as well as 
review of the Auditor General’s reports. The CPA reports twice a year. 
 
In 2002, the Chair of the Committee started an informal review of the first five years of the 
committee’s work by asking six key questions: 
y Could the CPA make the distinction between political and administrative aspects in the 
management of departments and agencies? 
y Could senior public servants testify without getting their political masters into hot water? 
y Could a bipartisan approach work in the CPA given the highly partisan nature of the 
legislature? 
y Does the Legislature permit the CAP to hold timely public accountability sessions with 
departments? 
y Will the CPA be able to review the many new performance reports that departments are 
required to produce each year? 
y Has the CPA ensured that its recommendations and the government’s action plans to deal 
with them are followed up effectively? 
 
The Chair of the Committee presented this framework for a PAC scorecard at the 2002 
meeting of all Canadian public accounts committees. He has made his own preliminary 
personal assessment of his committee’s score for each question/criterion, and he is planning 
to involve the committee in a more formal assessment in the next few months. The results 
could be presented to the legislature. 
 
This case identifies most of the key problems that PACs face in achieving effective results. 
Moreover it illustrates a courageous attempt by a PAC to assess its own effectiveness. 
 
We found very few committees that published reports dealing with their own performance, or 
assessed their success in informing the legislature about the accountability of the 
government. This is somewhat surprising in view of the fact that performance reporting is an 
important feature of effective legislative oversight, and some PACs already review and 
critique departmental performance reports, or performance reports of the Auditor General. It 
makes sense for the committee to set a good example and do what it insists others do. 
                                                 
39 Our thanks to Bob Miller, Executive Director of the Parliamentary Centre for pointing us in the direction of 
an IDRC publication on Organizational Assessment, a Framework for Improving Performance that suggests 
relevance as an indicator. 
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Unfortunately, at the present time, few of them are. Why? Perhaps some committees are 
assessing their performance in camera, or perhaps there is a problem in identifying success 
factors that are non-partisan.  
 
Case 7   VICTORIA (Australia) 
 
The Australian state of Victoria has had a Public Accounts and Estimates Committee since 
1895. Its members are senior, high profile parliamentarians 5 of whom are from the 
government side (including the chair), and 5 are opposition members one of whom is an 
independent. It has three main objectives: to encourage economic, efficient and effective 
utilization of public resources; to enhance accountability to Parliament and the public; and to 
enhance the presentation and disclosure of information to Parliament and the public. In part 
because of its estimates responsibilities, the Committee is more active than most PACs, 
averaging over 50 meetings a year. 
 
The Committee has very wide responsibilities which include initiating and carrying out its 
own enquiries, and to help with these the Committee has a panel of specialist advisers that 
deal with complex and technical issues. In addition, they work closely with the Office of the 
Auditor General. They frequently suggest changes to the terms of reference for performance 
audits, and selectively follow up on unresolved issues in its reports. The Committee also 
recommends the appointment of the Auditor General, and commissions a performance audit 
of the legislative audit office every 3 years. An interesting and possibly unique activity is the 
program of seminars that the Committee holds for members of Parliament on financial and 
accountability subjects. 
 
The Victoria PAC has carefully thought out what it would like to achieve and how to get it 
done. The Committee’s annual report has a chart depicting what the committee does, and the 
impact of its work. This performance and results framework starts with the inputs - the 
knowledge and skills of members, and the information received from stakeholders about the 
operations of Government - and the outputs, which are advice and recommendations. Then it 
moves into a detailed analysis of the intermediate outcomes - such as better performance of 
government - and final outcomes such as improved public confidence and better 
parliamentary control. In its annual report, the Committee publishes performance targets and 
plans for the year, as well as statistics on past performance. Thus, for example, the 
Committee sets a target for the Government’s acceptance of its recommendations, and it 
keeps count and publishes the results. It also keeps track of the timeliness of its review and 
coverage of the Auditor General’s reports, and is not afraid to report slippage if they do not 
get done all the work they expected to do. The Victorian PAC is a leader in performance 
reporting for PACs. 
 
In part, the reluctance to assess performance is a result of the difficulty of the questions that 
must be addressed, such as who should agree to the measures, who should see the results, and 
how they will be used. Measurement can sometimes have perverse effects, such as possibly 
encouraging a Committee to select easily resolvable issues or make soft recommendations. 
There is a danger that a committee might shy away from difficult but valuable work with 
long term impact that cannot be measured, given the current state of the art. 
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We sought to identify examples of “good practice” in PAC reporting and performance 
measurement. The outcome of our interviews with selected Chairs and document reviews are 
presented in Case Studies 6 and 7 (as well as Case 1, earlier), which show some examples of 
performance results that some PACs have achieved. 
 
 
Section 5: Conclusions  
 
In his study of Public Accounts Committees and Auditors General, McGee (2002) identifies 
three main priorities for action. First of all, given the importance of institutional capacity of 
the overseers for the effective financial oversight of the government expenditures, McGee 
suggests that the ability of the parliament, of the PAC and of the Auditors General to carry 
out their oversight functions should be improved. In his view, this result (capacity building) 
could be achieved by providing staffing and resources, training and access to information. 
Second, McGee underlines that a key determinant of the success in the activity of Auditors 
General is represented by their independence from partisan and political influence. Auditors 
General need to have the freedom to carry out their duties independently and impartially. 
Finally, McGee stresses that a key determinant for success in the activities of the PACs is 
represented by the availability of information and information exchange. McGee argues in 
fact that PACs need to exchange information and ideas in order to stay up-to-date with 
developments, changing standards and best practices as they emerge. 
 
The evidence presented in this paper is to a considerable extent consistent with the 
conclusions formulated by McGee. The PACs Chairs surveyed in the study conducted by the 
WBI reported that information availability and bipartisanship/non-partisanship are critical 
conditions for the success of the PACs as two of McGee’s three conclusions previously 
suggested. But the analysis conducted in this paper allows one to gain a much better 
understanding of how the capacity of the PACs can be built. Two sets of factors seem of 
great importance in this regard. One concerns the institutional design of the PAC, while the 
other concerns their behavior and functioning. 
 
The success of the PACs depends to a large extent on how they are institutionalized, on what 
institutional features and characteristics they have, that is their power and mandate. In this 
respect, we suggest that PACs should focus on governments’ financial activity and 
accountability rather than evaluating or assessing the content of the governments’ policies. 
Second, we believe that PACs should have the power to investigate all past and present 
government expenses regardless of when they were made. Third, PACs should be given the 
power to check whether the government actually undertakes some steps to implement the 
recommendations of the PAC itself. And finally, PACs must have a close working 
relationship with the Auditors General. 
 
The success of the PACs does not depend exclusively on institutional design, but it also and 
more importantly depends on the behavior of its members and the functioning of the 
committee itself. Here we have been able to identify some obvious best practices: PACs’ 
members must act in a non partisan fashion and should try to have a good working 
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relationship with other committee members in spite of possible partisan differences. In its 
functioning the PAC should always strive for consensus. 
 
Second, our study has revealed that effectiveness in the PACs’ activity increases whenever 
the PACs members study the documentation and prepare themselves before the PAC 
meetings. Third, the PACs should keep the transcripts of their meetings, they should publish 
their conclusions and recommendations, and they should involve the public and the media. 
Public opinion can in fact provide a strong incentive for governments to improve their 
financial accountability and avoid possible allegations of ineffective management of public 
resources.  
 
In the light of these conclusions, we are now able to present, however cautiously, some 
aspects of an ideal PAC (see Case 8 below). 
 
Case 8   An “Ideal Committee”? 
 
• The Committee is small; committees seem to work well with 5-11 members, none of 
whom should be government Ministers; 
• Senior opposition figures are associated with the PAC’s work, and probably chair the 
Committee; 
• The Chair is a senior parliamentarian, fair minded and respected by parliament; 
• The Committee is appointed for the full term of the parliament; 
• The Committee is adequately resourced, with an experienced clerk and a competent 
researcher(s) 
• There is clarity on the Committee’s  role and responsibilities; 
• The Committee meets frequently and regularly; 
• Hearings are open to the public; a full verbatim transcript and summary minutes  are 
quickly available for public distribution; 
• A steering committee plans the Committee’s work in advance and prepares an agenda for 
each meeting to the full Committee; 
• The typical witness is a senior public servant (the “accounting officer”) accompanied by 
the officials that have a detailed understanding of the issues under examination; 
• The Auditor’s Report is automatically referred to the Committee and the Auditor meets 
with the Committee to go over the highlights of the report; 
• In addition to issues raised by the Auditor, the Committee occasionally decides to 
investigate other matters; 
• Committee strives for some consensus in their reports; 
• The Committee issues formal substantive reports to parliament  at least annually; 
• The Committee has established a procedure with the government for following up its 
recommendations and is informed about what, if any, action has been taken; 
• In all its deliberations, the  Committee uses the Auditor as an expert advisor; 
• Parliaments hold an annual debate on the work of the Committee. 
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Annex 1: Main Conclusions from McGee book, The Overseers 
 
The Study Group identified three main priorities for action: 
 
1. Capacity building.  A constant theme is the need to improve institutional capability, 
that is, the ability of Parliaments, PACs and Auditors General’s offices to carry out 
their functions by being provided with sufficient resources and having adequate 
training and access to expertise that they require.   
2. Independence.  Particularly for Auditors General it is essential that they be free from 
political or legal constraints that could inhibit them carrying out their duties diligently 
and impartially. 
3. Information exchange.  PACs in particular need to have the means to exchange 
information and ideas so as to keep them up-to-date with important developments, 
changing standards and best-practices as they emerge.   
 
The following are the main individual conclusions and recommendations of the Study Group: 
 
The International Dimension: 
• There should be greater direct contact between Parliaments, especially PACs, and 
international financial institutions.   
• The CPA include good government as a subject of the theme or sub-theme of its 
conferences 
 
Auditors General: 
• The Auditor General should be an Officer of Parliament independent of the Executive 
• The appointment process for an Auditor General should involve consultation with a 
wide range of stakeholders 
• An Auditor General should only be removed from office on limited grounds that are 
specified in advance by law 
• Auditors General should actively participate in international Auditors General 
associations 
• Auditors General should actively introduce themselves and their services to all 
parliamentary committees, not just PACs 
• Auditors General have a role in approving internal audit standards 
• Central banks should be subject to the Auditor General’s audit mandate in the same 
way as other public sector agencies 
• The Auditor General should take account of the views of PACs in framing their work 
programs 
• Parliaments should be involved at the pre-Budget stage in determining the resources 
to be allocated to the Auditor General 
• Auditors General and their staff must have appropriate legal protections conferred on 
them to enable them to carry out their duties 
• PACs should keep under review any proposals to change the Auditor General’s audit 
mandate 
• Any company receiving public funding to deliver public services should be subject to 
the Auditor General’s audit mandate in respect of those services 
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• Auditors General should present their reports in an attractive form and devise active 
communications strategies 
• Auditors General should take steps to measure their own performance 
• The main of PACs work should be guided by the work of the Auditor General 
 
Public Accounts Committees: 
• Parliaments should regard the PAC as their pre-eminent committee 
• Senior opposition figures must be associated with the PAC’s work 
• There should always be sufficient experience and seniority among the membership of 
the PAC 
• Specially structured training be provided to PAC members 
• It is crucial that the Chairperson of the PAC has the qualities to ensure that the PAC 
works effectively 
• PACs must be adequately resourced to carry out their functions  
• PACs, while not being bound to act unanimously, should strive for some consensus in 
their reports 
• PACs should promote greater public awareness of their role  
• PACs should consider using subcommittees for specific inquiries 
• The Internet should be used to disseminate information on PACs 
• Procedures for follow-up action in recommendations in PAC reports are critical  
• Parliament should hold an annual debate on the work of the PAC  
• PACs in smaller and developing parliaments need improved access to information 
technology 
• A rational local method of allocating funding to PACs needs to be put in place to 
ensure that they have adequate resources 
• Smaller Parliaments need to take innovative steps to expand the pool of personnel 
available to serve on the PAC 
• Special attendance allowances, rather than a special salary, should be considered for 
PAC attendance 
• Links between PAC websites should be developed 
• The CPA should explore the potential for the use of a news group to encourage 
information exchange on PAC matters 
• The CPA should examine what options exist for conferences of associations of PACs 
• A compendium of Commonwealth PAC practice be established to be managed by a 
CPA branch or Parliament 
• Research should be undertaken into establishing a basis for making international 
comparisons of PAC performance 
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Annex 2: Survey Instrument 
 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to identify factors that can improve the success of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the legislature in monitoring the 
financial accountability of government. While not all countries have a committee with the precise name PAC, the questionnaire applies to any committee that 
performs the functions of a PAC, overseeing public administration to achieve value for money spent. 
 
1. What is the exact name of the committee in your jurisdiction that performs the functions of the Public Accounts Committee?  
………………………………................................................................................................................................................ 
 
2. Is the Chair of the Committee from (Please check one): the Governing Party? (____) or an Opposition Party? (____)  
 
3. How many Committee members are there?     Government   _____   Opposition _____  Total_____ 
 
4. How many Committee staff are there?     Professional   _____   Support staff _____  Total_____  
 
5. In what year was the Committee first established?   __ __ __ __ 
  
6. Please provide an indication of the amount of Committee activity in the past 3 years, i.e. since 1 January 1999?  
 
y Number of meetings (check one):    0-9_____  10-24_____   25-49_____ more than 50 _____  
y Number of subjects dealt with (check one):   0-9_____  10-24_____   25-49_____ more than 50 _____  
y Number of reports issued (check one):  0-9_____  10-24_____   25-49_____ more than 50 _____  
 
7.  Did the Committee achieve any of the following types of results or successes in the past 5 years i.e. since 1 January 1997?  If so, please indicate how 
often: 
 
y Government responds favorably to Committee recommendations:  frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____ 
y Government implements Committee recommendations:   frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____ 
y Changes in legislation were adopted as a result of Committee work:  frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____ 
y Improvements in the integrity of government information or data bases:  frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____ 
y Legal action was taken against officials who contravene laws:   frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____ 
y Disciplinary action was taken against officials who  
 contravene administrative guidelines:     frequently_____ seldom_____ never_____ 
 
y Please briefly describe any other types of results or successes achieved: 
………….……….………..........................................................................................................................................................................................................
....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
.................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
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8. Some suggest the following factors contribute to the success of a Public Accounts Committee. With reference to the powers and practices of your 
Committee, how important do you think each of the following factors has been in the past three years?  Please circle the appropriate number rating 
each factor as either: 1 - very important; 2 - somewhat important; 3 - not important; or 4 - not applicable. You are welcome to add any other factors 
that are missing in the space at the end of this question. 
 
Some possible success factors         1=Very important   
             2=Somewhat important   
              3=Not Important   
               4=Not Applicable 
 
Composition of the Committee 
 
8.1 Balanced representation of all major political parties on the committee    1 2 3 4 
 
8.2 Membership should exclude ministers of the Government      1 2 3 4 
 
Committee Powers 
 
8.3  Clear focus on holding the government accountable for its spending of    1 2 3 4 
taxpayers‘ money and its stewardship over public assets: 
8.4  Clear focus on administration of policy, and not on whether policies are good or bad.   1 2 3 4 
 
8.5  Having a permanent reference to examine the Public Accounts:      1 2 3 4 
 
8.6  Having a permanent reference to examine all reports of the Legislative Auditor:   1 2 3 4 
 
8.7  Power to call independent witnesses:        1 2 3 4 
 
8.8  Power to investigate or review all past, current and committed expenditures of government,   1 2 3 4 
       organizations receiving funds from the government and all state or crown corporations: 
8.9  Power to request (but not compel) the legislative auditor to perform specific reviews or tasks:  1 2 3 4 
  
8.10  Power to compel officials to attend and be held accountable for administrative,    1 2 3 4 
         performance even after they have left office: 
8.11  Power to compel witnesses to answer questions:      1 2 3 4 
 
8.12  Power to make recommendations and publish conclusions:     1 2 3 4 
 
8.13  Power to hold press conferences and issue press releases:     1 2 3 4 
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8.14  Power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or national security issues:  1 2 3 4 
 
8.15  Power to hold meetings and conduct enquiries even when the legislature is not in session:  1 2 3 4 
 
8.16  Power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the Legislative Auditor’s Act:  1 2 3 4 
 
8.17  Power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget:      1 2 3 4 
 
8.18  Power to choose subjects for examination without government direction and advice:   1 2 3 4 
 
8.19  Power to compel Ministers to appear before the committee:     1 2 3 4 
 
Committee Practices 
 
8.20  Close working relationship between members from different political parties:   1 2 3 4 
 
8.21  Advance preparation of members before hearings:      1 2 3 4 
 
8.22  Close working relationship with and research support from the legislative auditor:   1 2 3 4 
 
8.23  Independent technical expertise and research support for hearings:    1 2 3 4 
 
8.24  Separate subcommittees for groups of related departments:     1 2 3 4 
 
8.25  Strategic prioritization of items for committee review, with time limits for stages of   1 2 3 4 
         committee work like consideration of departmental replies, reporting, implementation reports: 
8.26  Transcripts kept of all hearings and meetings:       1 2 3 4 
 
8.27  Committee appointed for the life of the Legislature or Parliament     1 2 3 4 
          and stays active between sessions: 
8.28  Televised public hearings:         1 2 3 4 
 
8.29  Report to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated:     1 2 3 4 
 
8.30  Comprehensive response to recommendations from the government:    1 2 3 4 
 
8.31  Having committee members with at least 2 years of prior Committee experience:   1 2 3 4 
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8.32  Having committee members with prior administrative or business experience:   1 2 3 4 
 
8.33  Extra pay or other incentives for members to participate in hearings outside    1 2 3 4 
          the normal legislative session:       
8.34  Meeting place suitable for media and public access to hearings:     1 2 3 4 
 
8.35  Incentives to encourage administrative action on committee recommendations:   1 2 3 4 
 
8.36  Effective follow-up procedures to determine if action has been taken    1 2 3 4 
          to implement the committee’s recommendations: 
8.37  Good relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanisms     1 2 3 4 
  such as the budget committee 
 
Other important success factors for your Committee: 
 
8.38…….........…............................................................................     1 2 3 4 
 
8.39………………………….…........................................................     1 2 3 4 
 
8.40…….........…............................................................................     1 2 3 4 
 
 
9. Of those factors you rated “1 - very important” in question 8, which three have been most crucial in achieving successful results for your committee in 
the past three years? Why? 
 
  #1 ….………......…................   what has this helped you to do?……….......................................................................... 
 
 #2  ….………......…................   what has this helped you to do?……….......................................................................... 
 
 #3 ….………......…................   what has this helped you to do?……….......................................................................... 
 
 
10.  Of those factors in Question 8 that do not currently apply to your Committee (i.e. those you rated “4”), do you think that any of these powers and 
practices might make your committee more effective?  Please list them, and explain why. 
…………….………………......................................................................................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 
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11.  Are there any documents that describe the history, powers and practices of the Public Accounts Committee?  If so, could you please send us copies, 
or list them and let us know where they can be obtained? 
………………………………...................................................................................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
........................................... 
 
12. Please feel free to add or attach any additional comments that you would like to make. 
………………………………...................................................................................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................………………………………................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
................................................................................................................................................................................. 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you very much for your time and assistance. The results of this survey will be summarized and a copy sent to all those who respond, after the 
study is completed. 
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Annex 3:  Full Listing of Success Factors 
 
How many of the potential success factors do you consider very important? Somewhat 
important? Not important? Not applicable? (Sample = 34) 
 
Potential Success Factors Very Some Not n/a
Composition of the Committee     
8.1 Balanced representation of all major political parties on the committee 25* 3 1 4 
8.2 Membership should exclude ministers of the Government 23 4 0 6 
Committee Powers     
8.3  Clear focus on holding the government accountable for its spending of 
taxpayers‘ money and its stewardship over public assets: 
30 3 0 0 
8.4 Clear focus on administration of policy, and not on whether policies are good 
or bad. 
19 11 2 1 
8.5  Having a permanent reference to examine the Public Accounts:  28 4 1 0 
8.6  Having a permanent reference to examine all reports of the Legislative 
Auditor: 
21 7 0 5 
8.7  Power to call independent witnesses: 24 6 1 2 
8.8  Power to investigate or review all past, current and committed expenditures of 
government, organizations receiving funds from the government and all state or 
crown corporations: 
29 2 0 2 
8.9  Power to request (but not compel) the legislative auditor to perform specific 
reviews or tasks: 
17 7 3 6 
8.10  Power to compel officials to attend and be held accountable for 
administrative performance, even after they have left office: 
19 9 3 2 
8.11  Power to compel witnesses to answer questions: 27 2 2 2 
8.12  Power to make recommendations and publish conclusions: 32 1 0 0 
8.13  Power to hold press conferences and issue press releases: 13 12 5 3 
8.14  Power to hold in camera meetings, if dealing with sensitive or national 
security issues: 
20 7 3 3 
8.15  Power to hold meetings and conduct enquiries even when the legislature is 
not in session: 
24 5 2 2 
8.16  Power to review proposed legislation or amendments to the Legislative 
Auditor’s Act: 
11 7 5 10 
8.17  Power to review the Legislative Auditor’s budget: 6 4 7 16 
8.18  Power to choose subjects for examination without government direction and 
advice: 
30 3 0 0 
8.19  Power to compel Ministers to appear before the committee: 11 3 6 13 
Committee Practices     
8.20  Close working relationship between members from different political parties: 24 5 3 1 
8.21  Advance preparation of members before hearings: 26 6 1 0 
8.22  Close working relationship with and research support from the legislative 
auditor: 
22 6 2 3 
8.23  Independent technical expertise and research support for hearings: 17 8 3 5 
8.24  Separate subcommittees for groups of related departments: 5 6 6 16 
8.25  Strategic prioritization of items for committee review, with time limits for 
stages of committee work like consideration of departmental replies, reporting, 
implementation reports: 
12 18 2 1 
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8.26  Transcripts kept of all hearings and meetings: 29 3 1 0 
8.27  Committee appointed for the life of the Legislature or Parliament and stays 
active between sessions: 
19 5 1 8 
8.28  Televised public hearings: 3 6 10 14 
8.29  Report to the legislature annually, and ask for the report to be debated:  17 5 6 5 
8.30  Comprehensive response to recommendations from the government: 25 6 1 1 
8.31  Having committee members with at least 2 years of prior Committee 
experience: 
3 11 10 9 
8.32  Having committee members with prior administrative or business 
experience: 
4 14 10 5 
8.33  Extra pay or other incentives for members to participate in hearings outside 
the normal legislative session: 
8 7 7 11 
8.34  Meeting place suitable for media and public access to hearings: 17 6 2 8 
8.35  Incentives to encourage administrative action on committee 
recommendations: 
10 7 5 11 
8.36  Effective follow-up procedures to determine if action has been taken to 
implement the committee’s recommendations: 
24 6 2 1 
8.37  Good relations with other parliamentary oversight mechanisms such as the 
budget committee:         
10 10 4 9 
*Should be read as: 25/34 committees responded that factor 8.1 was very important in contributing to their 
success in the past 3 years 
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Annex 4: List of Respondents to the Survey 
 
1. Canada 
2. Alberta, Canada 
3. British Columbia, Canada 
4. New Brunswick, Canada 
5. Newfoundland, Canada 
6. Ontario, Canada 
7. Prince Edward Island, Canada 
8. Quebec, Canada 
9. United Kingdom, Central Government 
10. Northern Ireland 
11. Scotland 
12. Southern Ireland 
13. Australian Commonwealth Government 
14. New South Wales, Australia 
15. Northern Territory, Australia 
16. Queensland, Australia 
17. Victoria, Australia 
18. Tasmania, Australia 
19. South Australia 
20. Western Australia, Australia 
21. Australian Capital Territory, Australia 
22. New Zealand 
23. India 
24. Karnataka, India 
25. Orissa, India 
26. Punjab, India 
27. Rajasthan, India 
28. Tamil Nadu, India 
29. Pakistan 
30. Sindh, Pakistan 
31. Sri Lanka (PAC) 
32. Sri Lanka (Committee on Public Enterprises) 
33. Singapore 
34. Nepal 
35. Uttar Pradesh, India 
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